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Notes
COMPETENCY, COUNSEL, AND CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS’ INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE
SARA R. FABER†
ABSTRACT
Built into the foundation of the U.S. criminal justice system is the
idea that defendants must be able to participate in the trials against
them. The right not to stand trial unless competent is premised on the
idea that it is fundamentally unfair for defendants to stand trial unless
they are able to participate in their trial in at least some capacity.
Likewise, the right to counsel is based on a conception of defendants
controlling at least some decisions in their case. These rights express an
ideal that is foundational to our criminal system: defendant
participation must be protected.
Ultimately, though, the criminal system does not do a sufficient job
of protecting that ideal throughout the criminal process. Instead, the
criminal system is punctuated with procedural rules and constitutional
standards that actually erode defendants’ ability to participate in the
trials that affect their lives. In accordance with the ideal evident in the
competency standard and the right to counsel, we should build a
criminal justice system that allows for defendants to participate in
meaningful and impactful ways.
This Note first seeks out the doctrines that reveal the underlying
ideal of defendant participation, and then examines the procedural
rules and constitutional standards that prevent the actualization of that
ideal. Ultimately, it concludes that these rules and standards must be
changed to preserve the ideal of defendant participation throughout the
criminal process.
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It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such
that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.1
The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who
suffers the consequences if the defense fails. The counsel provision
supplements this design. It speaks of the assistance of counsel, and an
assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.2

INTRODUCTION
The conviction that criminal defendants should be active
participants in the trials against them is built into the fabric of the
American criminal justice system. This concern is evident in the
competency standard, the result of a longstanding prohibition against
allowing incompetent defendants to stand trial. The competency
standard is premised on the idea that criminal defendants must be
capable of at least some level of involvement in the trial against them.
If a defendant is incapable of making certain decisions and assisting in
his defense, making him stand trial is considered fundamentally unfair
and, in our modern system, a violation of his right to due process.
Though the competency standard requires only minimal
involvement, the prohibition against allowing an incompetent
defendant to stand trial demonstrates the underlying belief that
defendant participation is important and must be protected.
Ultimately, though, the criminal system does not sufficiently protect
that ideal throughout the criminal process. Instead, the criminal system
is riddled with rules and standards that erode defendants’ ability to
participate in the trials that affect their lives.
This Note seeks out the places in the criminal justice system where
the ideal of defendant participation is most pronounced, then looks to
the rules and standards inhibiting that participation. The Note
ultimately concludes that some procedural rules could be changed to
better preserve the ideal of defendant participation throughout the
criminal process. Part I focuses on the doctrines that reveal this
fundamental belief in the importance of defendant participation and
the ways that the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel has
evolved to undermine or inhibit defendant participation. Part I.A

1. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
2. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975).
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addresses the competency standard, exploring its common law origins
to illuminate the concern for defendant participation at its heart. It
then discusses how the modern competency standard asks for only
minimal defendant participation, relying on defense counsel to help
their clients through the trial. Part I.B links the competency standard’s
reliance on defense counsel to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel,
demonstrating that though the right to counsel is premised on the idea
of defense counsel as assistant to the defendant, decisionmaking
authority is increasingly allocated to defense counsel instead of to
defendants. Moreover, the extremely high bar for claims for ineffective
assistance of counsel often leaves defendants with no recourse when
their defense counsel makes a decision that they oppose.
Parts II and III propose procedural changes that could allow or
incentivize greater defendant participation. Part II contends that the
transfer of decisionmaking authority from defendants to defense
counsel undermines the ideal underlying the competency standard and
the right to counsel. Given the critical lack of resources for indigent
defense, most defense counsel do not have the time or resources to
adequately guide defendants through the decisions that they must
make. Relying on defense counsel to protect formally competent, but
actually low-functioning defendants’ right to a fair trial is thus an
inadequate measure, and reforms must be instituted to ensure more
effective representation or increased defendant participation in the
trial process. Because it is unlikely that the standard for proving
ineffective assistance of counsel will be lowered, Part III turns to a
solution that might be more easily enacted—removing the procedural
bars to defendant speech throughout the criminal process and thereby
allowing for increased defendant participation. Part III explains why
defendant speech is so significant, enumerates the procedural rules that
discourage defendants from speaking at their trials, and argues that
those procedural bars should be lifted or lessened.
I. THE PRIMACY AND EROSION OF DEFENDANT PARTICIPATION
The competency standard and, to a lesser extent, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel demonstrate the American criminal
justice system’s longstanding commitment to ensuring that criminal
defendants who stand trial are capable of participating in those trials.
Given the foundational nature of the right not to stand trial if judged
incompetent and the right to counsel—the former derived from the
common law and the latter enumerated in the Bill of Rights—the ideal
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of defendant participation underlying both can itself be described as
foundational to our criminal justice system. Despite that, the
constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel and the rules
of criminal procedure do not always reinforce or support defendant
participation.
This Part explores these two doctrines in the American criminal
justice system that make apparent the longstanding concern for
defendant participation, and the ways in which rules and standards
have eroded defendants’ ability to participate. It addresses the
competency standard, the right to counsel, and the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. The Competency Standard
1. History. It is a primary tenet of the American justice system
that criminal defendants who are incompetent cannot be made to stand
trial,3 and the system goes to great lengths to protect the right of
incompetent defendants not to be tried. Courts must follow procedures
that assure defendants’ competence. Failure to do so amounts to a due
process violation4 and results in reversal of a conviction.5 The question
of competency is so significant that it can be raised by the defense, the

3. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 171–72 (finding that the failure to evaluate the defendant’s
competency denied him due process); see also Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 940 (6th Cir.
1899) (“It is fundamental that an insane person can neither plead to an arraignment, be subjected
to a trial, or, after trial, receive judgment, or, after judgment, undergo punishment.”); United
States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 286–87 (S.D. Ala. 1906) (explaining that a person who is insane
cannot be tried).
4. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); see also Drope, 420 U.S. at 172 (“In Pate v.
Robinson, we held that the failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right
not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of his due process right
to a fair trial.” (citation omitted)); Youtsey, 97 F. at 941 (“It is not ‘due process of law’ to subject
an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or life.”).
5. See, e.g., Pate, 383 U.S. at 386 (directing that, because the defendant’s due process rights
were violated, he must be discharged or retried “within a reasonable time”). It has been argued
in several cases that defendants whose right not to be tried while incompetent was violated should
be reevaluated for competency at the time of the original trial; if a defendant was then found
competent at the time of the original trial, the conviction would stand. E.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at
183; Pate, 383 U.S. at 386–87. The Court has repeatedly rejected this argument because of the
difficulties inherent in such a backward-looking hearing. E.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 183; Pate, 383
U.S. at 386–87. As the Court explained in Pate, “we have previously emphasized the difficulty of
retrospectively determining an accused’s competence to stand trial. The jury would not be able to
observe the subject of their inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to testify solely from
information contained in the printed record.” Pate, 383 U.S. at 387 (citing Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam)).
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prosecution, or the court,6 and once raised, the issue cannot be waived
by the defendant.7 As the Supreme Court itself has noted, “the
prohibition [against incompetent defendants standing trial] is
fundamental to an adversary system of justice.”8
The prohibition against trying incompetent defendants has its
roots in the common law, which disallowed the arraignment, trial, or
sentencing of incompetent persons.9 Two primary concerns motivated
this prohibition: the accuracy of the trial and the defendant’s ability to
make rational decisions regarding her defense.10 Because the
defendant has the most information about her involvement (or lack
thereof) in the commission of the crime, her inability either to recollect
the events at issue or to effectively communicate her recollection to the
jury jeopardizes the accuracy of the trial.11 The prohibition also reflects
6. HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 436–42 (1954).
7. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 (“[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be
incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial.” (citing Taylor v. United States, 282 F.2d 16, 23 (8th Cir. 1960))).
8. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171–72.
9. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24 (explaining that “[i]n criminal cases
therefore idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts”); see also Drope, 420 U.S. at
171 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *24); Youtsey, 97 F. at 937 (adapting the common law bar
on trying incompetent defendants for American courts); Note, Incompetency To Stand Trial, 81
HARV. L. REV. 454, 454, (1967) [hereinafter Incompetency To Stand Trial] (“[C]urrently
operating law relating to incompetency to stand trial derives its substance and much of its form
from the common law rule . . . .”).
10. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *24. As Blackstone writes:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before arraignment for
it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead
to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner
becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defense? If, after he be
tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be
pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall
be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been
of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Incompetency To Stand Trial, supra note 9, at 457 (asserting that
the functions of the competency test are “to safeguard the accuracy of adjudication” and to ensure
that the defendant can exercise enough control over his defense as to make the proceeding seem
fair).
11. See United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 287 (S.D. Ala. 1906). The court stated:
The reason why an insane person, or one who though not insane, is laboring under such
mental infirmity as to prevent his rationally aiding in his defense, should not be put to
trial, is . . . because there may be circumstances lying in his private knowledge which
would prove him innocent or his legal irresponsibility, of which he can have no
advantage, because they are not known to persons who undertake his defense.
Id.; see also Jordan v. State, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (Tenn. 1911) (“There may be circumstances in . . .
which the defendant alone has knowledge, which would prove his innocence, the advantage of
which, if insane to such an extent that he did not appreciate the value of such facts, or the propriety
of communicating them to his counsel, he would be deprived.”).
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a concern with defendants’ capacity to make informed decisions. To
ensure that defendants are capable of decisionmaking, courts have
historically looked to whether the defendant is “capable of
understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on
against him, if he rightly comprehends his own condition in reference
to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense rationally.”12
Both of these concerns—accuracy and rational decisionmaking—
are ultimately related to the amount that a criminal defendant must be
able to participate in her trial. The common law ensured that a
defendant had the capacity to give testimony, consult with her lawyer,
help formulate the defense, and make sound decisions about the
disposition of her case13—measurements of competency that are fairly
minimal. The common law did not ensure that defendants had full
understandings of the mechanics of trial; to the contrary, the common
law, as applied by early American courts, only required that defendants
be sufficiently competent to fulfill their responsibilities at trial.14 As the
Supreme Court of Tennessee explained, “[i]t is not, however, every
case of insanity that will incapacitate one from properly making his
defense and prevent him from being placed upon trial. He may be
insane upon some subjects, yet perfectly sane in regard to all other
matters, and capable of properly advising his counsel.”15 Still, the
underlying concern for defendant participation illustrates baseline
ideals about the defendant’s role in the trial against her; without some
level of defendant participation—or at least the capacity for that level
of participation—the trial procedure is deemed inadequate and
violative of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
American courts have long followed the common law prohibition
against trying incompetent defendants, but it was not until 1956 that

12. Jordan, 135 S.W. at 329.
13. See, e.g., Chisolm, 149 F. at 287 (listing functions that a criminal defendant must be able
to perform); see also United States v. Harriman, 4 F. Supp. 186, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (inquiring
“whether or not the defendant is in present mental condition to comprehend the charges, to give
testimony, and to assist in the conduct of his defense”).
14. See, e.g., Chisolm, 149 F. at 287. The court stated:
[A] person, though not entirely sane, may be put upon trial in a criminal case if he
rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to the proceedings, and has such
possession and control of his mental powers, including the faculty of memory, as will
enable him to testify intelligently and give his counsel all the material facts bearing
upon the criminal act charged against him and material to repel the criminating
evidence, and has such poise of his faculties as will enable him to rationally and
properly exercise all the rights which the law gives him in contesting a conviction.
Id.
15. Jordan, 135 S.W. at 328–29.
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the Supreme Court first announced the test for determining
competency to stand trial in Dusky v. United States.16 In a per curiam
opinion, the Court stated that the “test must be whether [the
defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.”17 Twenty years later, the Court expounded on the test, writing
that a person may not stand trial if “he lacks the capacity to understand
the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with
counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense.”18 In accordance with
the Dusky test, courts examine whether the defendant is able to consult
with her lawyer and whether she has a rational understanding of the
proceedings, but—in accordance with common law precedent—the
defendant’s ability to understand and contribute need only be minimal
for her to be deemed competent.19
2. Implementation. The competency standard detailed in Dusky is
nearly identical to the common law competency standard—both
basically require a defendant be capable of understanding and
participating in the trial at a minimal level. The way that the Dusky
standard is implemented, however, requires even less of defendant.
The test, as implemented, “reflects a court’s assessment of the most
minimal role a defendant can play consistent with notions of due
process,”20 particularly because there seems to be a belief that
defendants with low capacity have defense counsel to protect their
right to a fair trial. In reality, though, courts rely on counsel to do more
than simply protect defendants’ due process rights; instead, defense
counsel are—at least sometimes—asked to make decisions for clients
who are incapable of making those decisions themselves.
State v. Beaudoin21 exemplifies both the minimal participation and
comprehension required of defendants and the way that the low
competency standard necessitates heavy reliance on defense counsel.

16.
17.
18.
19.

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam).
Id.
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
See Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2006) (describing various situations in which defendants can be
declared competent, including defendants with amnesia, mentally handicapped defendants, and
defendants on various medication that might impair their ability to participate in the trial).
20. Id.
21. State v. Beaudoin, 970 A.2d 39 (Vt. 2008).
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In Beaudoin, the Supreme Court of Vermont affirmed a trial court’s
competency determination because the defendant, Ronald Beaudoin,
was able to understand the most basic explanations of the trial
process.22 Beaudoin could state the charges against him, he correctly
identified his lawyer and her role as his counsel, and he understood the
difference between being found guilty or not guilty.23 But as the court’s
forensic psychiatrist—who declared Beaudoin competent—said of
him, Beaudoin’s “failure to understand certain points made during the
course of a trial ‘suggests a need for accommodation.’”24 The
psychiatrist recommended that the court accommodate Beaudoin’s
shortcomings by “using simple vocabulary and grammar, explaining
technical legal terms, allowing time for defendant’s attorney to
ascertain at frequent intervals that defendant comprehended what
transpired, or appointing a facilitator to ensure that defendant
understood the proceedings.”25 Beaudoin was found competent in spite
of numerous deficiencies in his ability to comprehend the proceedings;
though his lawyer would be required to check his comprehension “at
frequent intervals,”26 the court determined—and the state supreme
court affirmed—that this defendant was able to understand the
proceedings well enough to make informed decisions.27
Not only did the court psychiatrist rely on Beaudoin’s defense
counsel to explain the trial to Beaudoin, the court itself relied on
Beaudoin’s counsel to make decisions on his behalf. When his counsel
told the court that Beaudoin was unable to understand a decision that
needed to be made about the acceptability of a jury instruction, “[t]he
court asked [the] defendant ‘Is that paragraph okay with you if it’s okay
with your lawyer, Mr. Beaudoin?’ Defendant responded
affirmatively.”28 As the Supreme Court of Vermont stated while
22. Id. at 43.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 42. Although the court’s forensic psychiatrist ultimately judged Beaudoin
competent, his own expert clinical psychologist came to the opposite conclusion. Id. Beaudoin’s
expert “concluded that ‘because of his mental retardation and severe problems with language
problem solving . . . he would be incompetent because he would not have rational
understanding.’” Id. (alterations in original).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 43, 47.
28. Id. at 46. The entire interaction, which took place after the defendant had already been
deemed competent, proceeded as follows:
After the close of evidence, the parties discussed jury instructions. The court requested
that defense counsel discuss a paragraph in the instructions making specific reference
to defendant not testifying. Defense counsel reported that she showed the instruction
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affirming the trial court’s decision not to conduct a competency hearing
at that point, “[t]here is nothing in this interaction that would trigger
the court to make a second competency determination.”29 Though
Beaudoin was unable to comprehend the meaning of the decision he
was asked to make, the court did not need to assess his competency
because he had counsel present, and her decisions could stand in for
his own. As the next Section discusses, defense counsel can make some
decisions for their clients, but we should not allow a lawyer’s
decisionmaking capabilities to stand in for those of her client. The
competency standard is meant to ensure that defendants who stand
trial have the capacity to understand and make important decisions,
and we should not allow the presence of counsel to obscure that goal.
The First Circuit’s decision in Brown v. O’Brien30 is also
demonstrative of the minimal understanding necessary to demonstrate
competency and the reliance on counsel necessitated by the
competency standard. In Brown, the First Circuit upheld the trial
court’s determination of a defendant’s competency on habeas review,
despite testimony from multiple psychiatrists that the defendant, Eric
Brown, was incompetent to stand trial.31 In upholding the trial court’s
determination, the First Circuit noted that, although the defendant
“was surely impaired, . . . all experts agreed that he possessed at least
some understanding of the situation and some ability to reason about
it and discuss issues with counsel.”32 The court continued:
No one knows just how to measure precisely that “sufficient present
ability” to consult and understand of which the Supreme Court spoke
in Dusky. . . . A raving lunatic may not be tried, however patently
guilty and however hopeless his defense. But Brown is in a gray area,
to defendant but he couldn’t understand what it meant. She reiterated her objection to
defendant’s competency. The court asked defendant “Is that paragraph okay with you
if it’s okay with your lawyer, Mr. Beaudoin?” Defendant responded affirmatively.
Id.
29. Id.
30. Brown v. O’Brien, 666 F.3d 818 (1st Cir. 2012).
31. Id. at 825. One of the psychiatrists testified that the defendant “was suffering
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia, was delusional, believed he was the Anti–Christ, and heard
voices . . . [he] appeared to have deteriorated significantly since his last evaluation, was
inattentive, and would have serious difficulties following the proceedings and preparing a
defense.” Id. Ultimately, the district court based its competency determination on testimony from
a forensic psychiatrist for the government who judged the defendant competent after two
evaluations. Id. at 826. On habeas review at the First Circuit, the circuit court concluded that “the
state court finding was contestable, but it was not ‘unreasonable’ under the deferential habeas
standard.” Id. at 827.
32. Id. at 826 (emphasis in original).
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somewhat impaired; and although “prejudice” is not part of the
equation, it is hard to see what more Brown could have contributed
to the thorough “all fronts” defense he received.33

Though the First Circuit seemed skeptical about the defendant’s
ability to understand and participate in the trial, it affirmed the trial
court’s finding. The First Circuit noted that it affirmed, at least in part,
because of the deferential standard of review and because of the trial
court’s firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s demeanor,34 but it
ultimately allowed a conviction to stand where the defendant’s capacity
to understand and participate was admittedly dubious.
Brown also shows how the competency standard necessitates
reliance on defense counsel. The First Circuit noted that “it is hard to
see what more Brown could have contributed to the thorough ‘all
fronts’ defense he received,”35 but the primary defense presented at
trial was an affirmative defense of insanity,36 for which Brown’s help
was not necessary. To prove that Brown was insane at the time of his
crime, his defense counsel called four psychiatrists, who testified about
Brown’s mental illness, as well as a number of Brown’s friends, family
members, and former coworkers, who testified to Brown’s
deteriorating mental state during the months leading up to the crime.37
Brown himself did not testify at trial, and given the psychiatrists’

33. Id. at 826–27.
34. See id. at 826. The First Circuit noted:
Habeas challenges to state competency findings fail with remarkable regularity, partly
because habeas review is deferential and partly because the trial judge has seen the
witnesses and the defendant. The ability to understand the proceedings and assist
counsel is both a matter of degree and one in which trial judges, as well as health
professionals, have pertinent expertise.
Id. (citations omitted) (citing Competency To Stand Trial, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
459, 468 n.1432 (2011); then citing United States v. Figueroa-Gonzalez, 621 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.
2010); and then citing United States v. Ahrendt, 560 F.3d 69, 75 (1st Cir. 2009)). The standard of
review for competency hearings is usually low: in Georgia, it is abuse of discretion, see Wadley v.
State, 672 S.E.2d 504, 505–06 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“The question on appeal, therefore, is whether
the trial court abused its discretion in finding no reasonable doubt as to Wadley’s competency
and therefore no need to conduct further proceedings.”); in Massachusetts, “[a] judge’s
determination of competency is entitled to substantial deference ‘because the judge had the
opportunity to view the witnesses in open court and to evaluate the defendant personally,’”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 872 N.E.2d 711, 722 (Mass. 2007); in Vermont, appellate courts “will
not overturn a trial court’s competency determination if it is supported by the court’s findings,
and if the findings in turn are supported by credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous,” State
v. Tribble, 892 A.2d 232, 237 (Vt. 2005).
35. Brown, 666 F.3d at 826.
36. Brown, 872 N.E.2d at 718.
37. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant Eric Brown at 15–26, Brown, 666 F.3d 818 (No. 11-1037).
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analysis of his mental state, it is unclear how much help he could have
been to his lawyers in formulating the defense.38 The First Circuit noted
that Brown could not have contributed much to his defense, but the
competency standard is meant to ensure a minimum of defendant
participation, not to encourage clever lawyering in the absence of help
from the defendant. The point of the competency standard is
undermined when defendants can be tried because their defense
counsel has utilized strategies for which the defendant’s input is not
strictly necessary.
The history of the competency standard underscores that a
defendant’s participation is fundamental to our criminal justice system.
The American criminal justice system adopted the concern for
defendant participation from the common law, so the concern for
defendant participation has always been present in the American legal
system. As the next Section describes, our criminal system has
increasingly allowed defense counsel to make decisions for their clients
and prevented defendants from participating in their trials in the most
meaningful and impactful ways.
B. Overreliance on Defense Counsel Is Compounded by the
Increasing Power They Are Given over Their Clients’ Cases
As mentioned in the last Section, the low bar for defendant
competency arises in part from the courts’ reliance on lawyers to
protect their clients’ right to a fair trial. But the ideals behind the
competency standard demonstrate an interest in defendant
participation that would require a more robust partnership between
defendants and their counsel than the system currently supports.
The history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel reveals an
idea of the defendant as the leader of their trial, with defense counsel
assisting rather than supplanting the defendant.39 Undermining this

38. Even the state’s psychiatrist, who deemed Brown competent to stand trial, described a
person of low capacity: the psychiatrist testified “that while Brown did hear voices, they were not
overly distracting, and that during the evaluation, Brown was able to concentrate and focus, had
a good short-term memory, and showed no gross impairment in judgment.” Brown, 666 F.3d at
826.
39. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right To
Control the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147, 1163–69 (2010) (reviewing the “common law practices in
England, in the Colonies prior to the ratification of the Constitution, and in the states at the time
the Bill of Rights took hold” to determine the meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Kimberly Helene Zelnick, In Gideon’s Shadow: The Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the
Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 363, 366–67 (2003) (“[T]he counsel
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ideal, however, are two intersecting lines of Supreme Court cases, one
of which assigns certain decisions solely to defendants40 and the second
of which—the cases enumerating and applying the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel—increasingly allows defense counsel
to encroach on defendants’ decisionmaking authority, even for those
decisions that are supposed to be left to defendants alone.41 Rather
than creating doctrine that incentivizes or encourages increased
defendant participation, the Supreme Court has crafted a doctrine of
ineffective assistance that allows defense counsel to make unilateral
decisions for their clients, sometimes even over their objections.42
This Section describes the history of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and its implications for the relationship between defendants
and their counsel, and then discusses the ways that certain doctrines
have allowed defense counsel to infringe on defendant
decisionmaking.
1. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel. Our current criminal justice
system regards defense counsel as directors of their clients’ cases,43 but
the text and history of the Sixth Amendment right to “Assistance of
Counsel” reveals that defense counsel were originally conceived of as
“[a]ssistan[ts],” not directors.44 At the time the Sixth Amendment was
written, the presence of any defense counsel was a relatively new

clause guarantees not only that a defendant will have the right to counsel, but also that in
exercising that right, the defendant will maintain autonomy over his own defense.”).
40. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“It is also recognized that the accused has
the ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case . . . .”). For more
on Jones, see infra notes 55–58.
41. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (setting the standard for proving
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). For more on the Strickland standard, see infra notes 64–
99 and accompanying text.
42. For more on how the Strickland standard has allowed defense counsel to usurp their
clients’ decisionmaking authority, see infra Part I.B.2.
43. For a description of how the competency standard relies on defense counsel to guard
their clients’ rights, see supra Part I.A.2. For a description of how the courts have shifted
decisionmaking authority from defendants to defense counsel, see infra Part II.B.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1168 (“[A]t the time the
Sixth Amendment was debated and ratified, counsel truly was an assistant rather than a master.”);
Zelnick, supra note 39, at 366 (asserting that defense counsel are described in the Constitution
“not as the protector or even the defender of the accused, but rather as the defendant’s
“Assistan[t]” (alterations in original)).
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phenomenon.45 Self-representation was the norm,46 and when defense
counsel were present, they usually “played a relatively limited role,
primarily cross-examining witnesses and arguing legal questions.”47
“[T]he entire history upon which the Framers drafted the Sixth
Amendment featured the defendant as the primary decision-maker
and advocate in the case.”48
The text of the Amendment corresponds with that history: it
creates a right “to have the Assistance of Counsel.”49 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the text leaves to the defendant the work of
and responsibility for mounting a defense, writing that “[t]he Sixth
Amendment . . . grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense. . . . The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks
of the ‘assistance’ of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still
an assistant.”50
The text and history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel thus
demonstrate that the role of defense counsel was never meant to be a
stand-in for defendants, nor was the right to counsel meant to supplant
the defendant’s other constitutional rights. “The right to counsel, far
from being seen as a means for undermining defendant autonomy,
instead was intended, like the other trial guarantees in the
Constitution, to provide defendants themselves with a necessary tool

45. See generally WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS
(1955) (reviewing the historical availability of defense counsel in pre-Revolutionary England and
pre- and post-Revolutionary America); see also Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1166–67 (reviewing
the emergence of the presence of defense counsel in England and the American colonies around
the time of the American Revolution).
46. Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1166 (“As late as 1800 it seems probable that only in New
Jersey, by statute, and in Connecticut, by practice, did the accused enjoy a full right to retain
counsel, and to have counsel appointed if he were unable to afford it himself.” (citing BEANEY,
supra note 45, at 21 (1955))).
47. Id. at 1168.
48. Id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
50. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819–20 (1975). In Faretta, the Court recognized that
criminal defendants have a right to self-representation, disallowing states from imposing counsel
on defendants without their consent. Id. at 807, 818. But the Supreme Court noted that, so long
as the defendant did consent to having counsel represent him, counsel had the ability to direct the
case:
It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case,
law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of
trial strategy in many areas. This allocation can only be justified, however, by the
defendant’s consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative.
Id. at 820–21 (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451 (1965); then citing Brookhart v. Janis,
384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966); and then citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963)).
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for making and acting upon the most well-informed decisions.”51
Counsel were intended to help guide defendants through the trial,
putting the defendant “in the best position to choose for himself the
course most advantageous from his own perspective.”52 In light of this
historical and textual understanding, the Sixth Amendment seems to
call for a partnership between a defendant and her counsel rather than
a usurpation by counsel of defendant’s decisionmaking capability.53
2. Defendant Decisionmaking and Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel. Allocating decisionmaking authority between defendants
and their counsel proves difficult,54 but the Supreme Court has held
that there are a few “fundamental decisions regarding the case” that
are left to the exclusive purview of the defendant.55 Other than those
key decisions, defense counsel are empowered to make all decisions
regarding day-to-day case management and, significantly, overall case
strategy. The latter is important because the Supreme Court’s standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel includes a presumption that
counsel’s decisions are part of the trial strategy, and thus correctly
within counsel’s purview.56 This standard puts the bar for proving
ineffective assistance of counsel so high that it is nearly impossible for
defendants to succeed on those claims, even when their counsel has
encroached on the few “fundamental decisions regarding the case” that
are supposed to be left to the defendant alone.57
In Jones v. Barnes,58 the Supreme Court held that “the accused has
the ultimate authority” to decide “whether to plead guilty, waive a jury,

51. Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1169.
52. Id.
53. This argument should not be misconstrued to mean that this Note advocates for criminal
defendants to do most, or even half of their own defense work. Rather, the historical
understanding of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is intended to bolster the argument that
we should be building a criminal justice system that better affords criminal defendants the
opportunity to participate in the trials against them. Counsel’s role should be to help bolster the
defendant’s ability and choice whether to participate.
54. For an overview of the arguments and evidence on both sides of the longstanding debate
on how to allocate decisionmaking power between defendants and their counsel, see Rodney J.
Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REV.
1, 18 (1998).
55. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
56. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
57. Jones, 463 U.S. at 751.
58. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.”59 Aside from those
exceptions, defense counsel is empowered “to manage the case and to
make all tactical decisions . . . [and] to present the client’s case in accord
with counsel’s best professional judgment, regardless of the client’s
wishes.”60 Defense counsel also has the ability to make all decisions
regarding the “day-to-day conduct of the defense,”61 including
decisions “to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to put certain
witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of
certain witnesses in advance of trial.”62 As the Court has mentioned,
“[t]he adversary process could not function effectively if every tactical
decision required client approval.”63
Since the Court enunciated the standard for ineffective assistance
of counsel in Strickland v. Washington,64 however, courts have
increasingly allowed lawyers to encroach on even those “fundamental
decisions” that are supposed to be left to the defendant. In Strickland,
the Court held that, in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, defendants must first show that their lawyer’s
performance was deficient, and then must show “that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense . . . [so] as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial.”65 In other words, a defendant making an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim must not only show that their counsel’s
performance was insufficient, but also demonstrate “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different.”66
The Strickland standard is explicitly deferential to lawyers’
decisionmaking. The Court refused to spell out any guidelines for what
qualifies as deficient performance,67 instead opting for a standard of

59. Id. at 751.
60. Uphoff & Wood, supra note 54, at 18.
61. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Taylor v.
Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988) (“Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot
waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer
has—and must have—full authority to manage the conduct of the trial.” (footnote omitted) (citing
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1966); then citing Doughty v. State, 470 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Ind.
1984); and then citing Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963)).
62. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 418.
63. Id.
64. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 694.
67. As the Court explained:
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review in which courts determine “whether counsel’s assistance was
reasonable considering all the circumstances.”68 Further, the Court
mandated that the standard for reviewing counsel’s performance
should be reasonableness at the time of trial; courts should make
“every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”69
Ultimately, “a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that,
under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy.’”70
This extremely deferential standard has allowed defense lawyers
to infringe upon their clients’ decisionmaking authority without
reproach and without recourse for those clients. In Jones, the Supreme
Court mandated that only defendants can decide “whether to plead
guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal,”71
but the Court has failed to recognize ineffective assistance in cases in
which counsel have neglected to inform their client about the right to
appeal,72 effectively barred their client from testifying,73 and conceded
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account
of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules
would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and
restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.
Id. at 688–89.
68. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 689.
70. Id. The Court in Strickland even explicitly stated that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential.” Id. Human rights lawyer and professor Steven Bright
criticized the low Strickland standard thusly:
Much less than mediocre assistance passes muster under the Strickland standard.
Errors in judgment and other mistakes may readily be characterized as ‘strategy’ or
‘tactics’ and thus are beyond review. Indeed, courts employ a lesser standard for
judging the competence of lawyers in a capital case than the standard for malpractice
for doctors, accountants, and architects.
Steven Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1858 (1994).
71. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
72. For a further discussion of the Court’s analysis in cases where counsel failed to inform
their client about their right to appeal, see infra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
73. For example, in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the defendant argued that he had
been denied effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer threatened to report him to the
court for perjury if he testified in a manner that his lawyer thought was perjurious. Id. at 161–62.
The Court held that, because there is no right to testify falsely, counsel’s assistance was not
prejudicial. Id. at 173, 175. According to the Court, the lawyer “can in no sense be said to have
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to guilt of a lesser offense in the opening statements of a trial.74 White
collar defense attorney Kimberly Helene Zelnick argues that it is the
Strickland standard that prevents defendants from effectively
exercising the right to make those decisions.75 “The power of the
attorney to override his client’s wishes is virtually absolute whenever
the decisions can reasonably be classified as ‘trial strategy.’ Moreover,
courts do not hesitate in labeling a decision as trial strategy even when
the decision is plainly linked to fundamental rights.”76
In Roe v. Flores-Ortega,77 for example, the Court followed
Strickland in “[d]eclining to adopt a bright-line rule” about whether
the failure to consult with one’s client about filing an appeal was per se
ineffective assistance of counsel.78 Instead, the Court ruled that it was
only per se unreasonable for defense counsel to fail to consult with
their client about an appeal when a rational defendant would want an
appeal or when a particular defendant had “reasonably demonstrated
to counsel that he was interested in appealing.”79 In so ruling, the Court
essentially allowed defense counsel—in certain circumstances—to
decide not to consult with their client about an appeal and then to
decide single-handedly not to file one, even as the Court noted that the
decision on whether to file an appeal is solely within the defendant’s

forced respondent into an impermissible choice between his right to counsel and his right to testify
as he proposed for there was no permissible choice to testify falsely.” Id. at 173. Zelnick argues
that this framing of the case allowed the Court to dodge the more important question of whether
an attorney could abrogate his client’s right to testify. Zelnick, supra note 39, at 385–86.
74. For a further discussion of the effect of counsel conceding to their client’s guilt, see infra
notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
75. Zelnick argues that Strickland is operating to curtail defendants’ rights, Zelnick, supra
note 39, at 381–99, but Professor Erica Hashimoto argues that it is the right to counsel itself that
has limited the defendant’s “autonomy interest.” Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1149. As
Hashimoto states, “[b]eginning in the late 1960s, after the Court’s decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, however, courts began to shift, in subtle ways, decisional control over cases from
clients to counsel.” Id.
76. Zelnick, supra note 39, at 388.
77. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
78. Zelnick, supra note 39, at 386. The Court made explicit that it was declining to set a
bright-line rule because of Strickland’s warning against specific guidelines with which to measure
effective counsel: “We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel’s failure
to consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable, and therefore deficient.
Such a holding would be inconsistent with both our decision in Strickland and common sense.”
Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 479.
79. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 480. The Court further followed Strickland in holding that a
defendant making an ineffective assistance claim based on a counselor’s failure to file an appeal
must prove that the decisions prejudiced the defendant, meaning that, if not for counsel’s failure
to file, the defendant would have filed an appeal. Id. at 484.
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purview.80 But if the authority to decide whether to file an appeal rests
solely with the defendant, defense counsel should never be able to
decide unilaterally not to file one. It is not enough that defense counsel
are required to ask defendants who have a reasonable shot at an appeal
whether they want to file one because a defendant’s right to appeal is
not contingent on how strong a defendant’s case is. Instead, as Justice
Souter argued in his dissent, if defendants alone can make that
decision, then defense counsel that do not ask their client whether they
want to file an appeal and do not file one have effectively taken that
decision from the defendant and rendered ineffective assistance.81
Courts have also allowed defense counsel to concede guilt at
certain parts of trial or to lesser offenses, which infringes on
defendants’ exclusive right to decide to plead guilty. In Florida v.
Nixon,82 the Supreme Court held that defense counsel had the
authority to concede his client’s guilt at the guilt/innocence phase of a
capital trial because that is a strategic trial decision.83 As the Court
wrote, “if counsel’s strategy, given the evidence bearing on the
defendant’s guilt, satisfies the Strickland standard, that is the end of the
matter; no tenable claim of ineffective assistance would remain.”84 In
other words, if the evidence against a capital defendant is great enough,
it is reasonable for a lawyer to decide to concede his client’s guilt to a
capital crime—without his client’s explicit consent85—even though the
decision to plead guilty is supposed to be left exclusively to the
defendant and even though the decision requires more than “tacit
acquiescence.”86 Similarly, in Haynes v. Cain,87 an en banc panel of the
Fifth Circuit held that defense counsel’s decision to concede their
80. See id. at 479 (“[T]he decision to appeal rests with the defendant.”).
81. Id. at 488–93 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
82. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004).
83. Id. at 191–93.
84. Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
85. In Nixon, the question was specifically whether defense counsel could decide to concede
a client’s guilt without any input from the client on the decision; despite defense counsel’s
repeated attempt to explain his strategy to the defendant in Nixon, the defendant was “generally
unresponsive during their discussions” and “never verbally approved or protested [the] proposed
strategy.” Id. at 181. The separate, but related question of whether defense counsel can
permissibly decide to concede their client’s guilt over their client’s express objection is currently
before the Court in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 53 (2018). The court heard oral arguments on
January 17, 2018, but there was no decision at the time of publication.
86. Id. at 188–89.
87. Haynes v. Cain (Haynes II), 298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). At the time that the
Fifth Circuit decided Haynes II, the question had not been decided by the Supreme Court, but
the decision in Haynes II could be superseded by the Court’s upcoming decision in McCoy.
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client’s guilt to second-degree murder during the trial’s opening
statements88—despite the defendant’s fervent statements that he
wished to plead not guilty to all counts charged89—was a reasonable
trial strategy “[g]iven the overwhelming evidence defense counsel
faced.”90 Moreover, the en banc Fifth Circuit noted that, even if
defense counsel’s failure to get their client’s consent to concede to
lower charges amounted to deficient performance under Strickland, an
ineffective assistance claim would still fail on the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test. “Based on the prosecution’s nearly conclusive evidence
that Haynes [the defendant] committed the offense in question,” the
defendant could not have established “that without the concession
strategy, he would have been acquitted of first degree murder.”91 In
effect, the stringency of the Strickland ineffective assistance standard
piles on top of the defense counsel’s usurpation of their client’s
decisionmaking authority, making it even more difficult for defendants
to assert their decisionmaking rights or to receive relief when those
rights have been violated.

88. The defendant had been charged with first-degree murder, and the defense counsel
decided that the evidence of defendant’s guilt was so overwhelming that the best they could do
was to argue for a conviction for second-degree murder instead, thus avoiding the death penalty.
Id. at 377–78. In accordance with this strategy, during opening statements the defense counsel
conceded that the defendant had abducted, raped, and possibly robbed the victim, and that she
had died during the commission of these crimes. Haynes v. Cain (Haynes I), 272 F.3d 757, 759
(5th Cir. 2001). But, the defense argued, her death had not been intentional. Id.
89. Haynes II, 298 F.3d at 379. After defense counsel’s opening statement, the defendant
told the court:
I don’t agree with what these lawyers are doing, talking about I’m guilty of second
degree murder. I’m not guilty of second degree or first degree. . . .
....
. . . I specifically asked my lawyers not to do what they—they said they were going
to do this second degree junk. I don’t like that. I mean, I’m not guilty. I don’t feel I’m
guilty of second degree or first degree and I don’t agree with them.
Haynes I, 272 F.3d at 759–60.
90. Haynes II, 298 F.3d at 382 (majority opinion).
91. Id. at 383. In another particularly perverse application of the prejudice part of the
Strickland test, a defendant’s ineffective assistance claim was denied after his attorney incorrectly
understood the meaning of felony murder and had told the jury multiple times that, although her
client was guilty of armed robbery, he was not guilty of the murder that accompanied the robbery.
Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1517–18 (11th Cir. 1992). Though the Eleventh Circuit noted
that it was “disturbed by Steger’s [counsel’s] representation of Alphonso Cave [defendant]” and
was “convinced that Steger completely misunderstood the law of felony murder, which is a
concept that . . . should be within the grasp of lawyers, especially those defending a client charged
with a capital offense,” it also believed that the evidence against the defendant was so great “that
even a highly competent lawyer could not have won Cave an acquittal.” Id. at 1518. Thus, the
defendant’s claim failed on the prejudice portion of the Strickland test. Id.
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In both Nixon and Haynes, the Supreme Court and the Fifth
Circuit made sure to note that the decisions did not interfere with the
defendant’s exclusive ability to decide whether to plead guilty.92 In
Nixon, the Court emphasized that defense counsel’s decision to
concede the defendant’s guilt did not do away with the trial altogether;
although a guilty plea “is a ‘stipulation that no proof by the prosecution
need be advanced,’”93 in this trial “[t]he State was obliged to present
during the guilt phase competent, admissible evidence establishing the
essential elements of the crimes with which Nixon was charged.”94 The
Court noted that the defendant retained the right to cross-examine
witnesses and “could endeavor . . . to exclude prejudicial evidence.”95
Likewise, in Haynes, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “defense counsel
did not entirely fail to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing.”96 Though counsel admitted that their client
committed second-degree murder, counsel “remained active at trial,
probing weaknesses in the prosecution’s case on the issue of intent”
and cross-examining the state’s witnesses, intending to “focus the jury’s
attention on the one area where the prosecution’s case was not
exceedingly strong.”97
These analyses seem to suggest that there is a meaningful
difference between pleading guilty and conceding guilt while still
testing parts of the government’s case at trial, but the difference is
probably null to defendants who wish to plead not guilty. As Professor
Erica Hashimoto points out, defendants have an interest in overseeing
the decisions made by their defense counsel because it is their liberty
at stake.98 “[B]ecause the defendant is the only person who can
prioritize the various competing interests at stake—including the risks
of going to trial, the sentencing exposure, and other possible
consequences of a guilty plea—the defendant has a significant
autonomy interest in controlling the key decisions in the case.”99 If the
ability to plead guilty is reserved exclusively to the defendant whose

92. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 188–89 (2004); Haynes II, 298 F.3d at 381–82.
93. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 188 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 n.4 (1969)).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Haynes II, 298 F.3d at 381.
97. Id. at 382.
98. See Hashimoto, supra note 39, at 1149 (arguing that “there is a strong jurisprudential
argument that the Constitution should protect the interest of a criminal defendant in exercising
control over his case” because a conviction results in the loss of the defendant’s autonomy).
99. Id. at 1178–79.
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liberty is at stake, counsel should not be allowed to commandeer that
right merely because the procedural safeguards of the trial remain.
Ultimately, the ideals of the competency standard and the
foundation of the right to counsel are at odds with both the reliance on
counsel inherent in the competency standard and the encroachment on
defendants’ decisionmaking authority. The Jones/Strickland line of
cases simultaneously allocates certain decisions to defendants’
exclusive purview and allows defense counsel to trespass on
defendants’ decisionmaking authority. Furthermore, Strickland sets
the standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel so high that
it is nearly impossible for defendants to receive any recourse for
decisions made by counsel, even when those decisions should by right
be made by the defendant. And although the competency standard
seeks to ensure a minimum level of defendant participation, the
competency standard is justified by increasing reliance on lawyers to
protect their clients’ rights when their clients may be unable to do so
for themselves. Thus, “while the Court has blessed pathetic attorney
performances with one hand, it has celebrated the wisdom of counsel
with the other, widening the scope of attorney discretion and the
appointed attorney’s power over his hapless client.”100 These various
doctrines—the competency standard and the Jones/Strickland lines of
cases—give increasing authority to defense counsel, ignoring the ideal
of defendant participation fundamental to the competency standard.
As the next two Parts argue, the U.S. criminal justice system should
respect the underlying ideal of defendant participation by incentivizing
increased partnership between defendants and their defense counsel
and by instituting procedures that allow defendants to make more
meaningful choices about their level of participation in the trials
affecting them.
II. INDIGENT DEFENSE AND RAISING THE STRICKLAND STANDARD
As was explained in Part I, the competency standard and the
Strickland standard interact to allow defense counsel to make a
number of decisions for their clients. The competency standard, in
particular, depends on defense counsel to protect their clients’ right to
a fair trial. But the reality of the criminal justice system is that public
defenders, who take on the bulk of criminal defense work,101 are
100. Zelnick, supra note 39, at 376.
101. See MAREA BEEMAN, A.B.A., USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC
DEFENSE PROGRAMS 2 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
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extraordinarily overworked and underresourced.102 So long as the
criminal system relies on defense counsel to help their clients—who
may be formally competent but require assistance—we must lower the
standard for proving ineffective assistance of counsel. Should,
however, this standard not be lowered—as it likely will not be—we
should be even more focused on enacting rules of criminal procedure
that allow for a truer partnership between defense counsel and their
clients. This Part explores the first of two potential solutions to the lack
of defendant participation: lowering the Strickland standard. Part III
then focuses on the second possible solution of changing the rules of
criminal procedure to allow for increased defendant participation
through speech.103
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_sustaining_and_improving_public_defense.authche
ckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/72NF-VS2C] (“[R]esearchers estimate that 60 to 90 percent of all
criminal cases involve indigent defendants.”); CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3CU-8FGD]
(“[A]pproximately 66% of felony Federal defendants and 82% of felony defendants in large State
courts were represented by public defenders or assigned counsel.”); Eve Brensike Primus,
Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims in State and
Federal Postconviction Proceedings, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (A.B.A.), Fall 2009, at 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/cri
mjust_cjmag_24_3_primus.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RD8P-A3NN] (“With public
defenders representing 80 percent of criminal defendants nationwide, the indigent defense crisis
is a problem that our criminal justice system can no longer afford to ignore.”).
102. See A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 8 tbl.1 (2004)
[hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_pr
oceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3VU-7XSV] (describing percentages of indigent
defense expenditures attributable to either state or counties in 2002).
103. It is worth mentioning that this Note does not explore the possibility of raising the
competency standard. Defendants who are found incompetent are usually civilly committed until
they are competent to stand trial or the charges against them are dropped. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d) (2018) (mandating that defendants who are judged incompetent be hospitalized for
treatment until they are competent to stand trial or the charges against them are dropped);
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110 (2008) (mandating that courts commit incompetent defendants
charged with felonies and allowing courts to decide whether to commit incompetent defendants
charged with “any other crime” for no longer than ninety days); FLA. STAT. § 916.13 (2016)
(“Every defendant who is charged with a felony and who is adjudicated incompetent to proceed
may be involuntarily committed.”). Although some jurisdictions forbid indefinitely committing
incompetent defendants, other jurisdictions do not impose a maximum time limit that an
incompetent defendant can remain in civil commitment. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.47.110
(mandating ninety-day limit on civil commitment of incompetent defendants); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 46B.0095(a) (2017) (“A defendant may not . . . be committed to a mental hospital
or other inpatient or residential facility . . . , ordered to participate in an outpatient . . . treatment
program, or subjected to any combination of inpatient treatment [and] outpatient . . .
treatment . . . for a cumulative period that exceeds the maximum term provided by law for the
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The competency standard necessitates heavy dependence on
defense counsel to protect their clients’ right to a fair trial, and even to
make decisions on their clients’ behalf. In doing so, it also incorporates
the Strickland standard to ensure that defense counsel provide
competent representation to their clients. But as discussed in Part I,
Strickland set the bar for proving or receiving relief for ineffective
assistance so high that the Strickland standard can be said to effectively
remove defendants’ decisionmaking authority and grant it instead to
their lawyers. This has obvious negative implications for defendants’
ability to participate in trials, and those implications become even more
dire because of the state of indigent defense. Most criminal defendants
in the American criminal justice system are represented by public or
assigned counsel,104 yet public defense in the United States is
notoriously underresourced.105 Given that reality, we should be
skeptical of rules or standards that transfer so much authority to
defense counsel and preclude defendants from having the opportunity
to be full participants in the trials against them.
Indigent defense services are responsible for the vast majority of
criminal defense, but public defense offices are notoriously
underfunded and overworked. In 2000, the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics found that 66 percent of federal
felony defendants and 82 percent of felony defendants “in large State
courts were represented by public defenders or assigned counsel.”106
But the lack of funding for public defense makes that large burden
incredibly difficult to meet, especially for indigent defense at the state
level,107 where about 90 percent of all criminal prosecutions take

offense for which the defendant was to be tried.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.3 (2017) (allowing
for the civil commitment “without limitation[]” of incompetent defendants who have been
charged with capital murder, so long as a trial court reviews the defendant’s competency every six
months); see also Brian T. Lawler, Comment, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Indefinite Confinement
and the Unconstitutional Treatment of North Carolinians with Mental Retardation, 35 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 257, 257 (2013) (recounting the story of Floyd Brown, who was civilly committed in North
Carolina for fourteen years after being judged incapable of proceeding to trial). Regardless of the
existence of a limitation on the length of civil commitment, raising the competency standard
would inevitably result in the civil commitment of more defendants, an outcome for which this
Note does not advocate.
104. See Primus, supra note 101, at 1 (highlighting that public defenders represent 80 percent
of the nation’s criminal defendants).
105. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102 (chronicling the lack of funding for
American public defense and the problems it creates).
106. HARLOW, supra note 101, at 1.
107. See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2153 (2013) (“[M]ost states, counties, and
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place.108 States fund indigent defense services in a variety of ways—
some states use state money for public defense, some require that
counties provide money individually, and others use a combination of
state and local funding.109 Regardless of how funding is secured,
however, it is generally insufficient to meet the needs of indigent
defense services.110 This lack of resources for public defense is
especially galling when compared to the funding afforded prosecutors.
In 2007, public defender offices in forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia received a total $2.3 billion in funding.111 In the same year,
prosecutors’ offices nationwide received $5.8 billion,112 more than
double the funding allotted to public defense.
As a result of the lack of resources, public defenders are
underpaid, which results in “meet ‘em and plead ‘em”-style
lawyering.113 “Hourly rates for public defenders and panel attorneys
can run as low as $40 per hour and in some cases have averaged out to
$4 per hour.”114 In localities that contract with private attorneys to
provide indigent defense, the compensation paid those attorneys varies

municipalities . . . have refused to provide funding necessary for counsel and equal justice.”); Lisa
Kern Griffin, State Incentives, Plea Bargaining Regulation, and the Failed Market for Indigent
Defense, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 93 n.83 (2017) (“[P]ublic defense in the federal criminal
justice system—largely because of the requirements of the 1964 Criminal Justice Act—functions
in a way widely regarded as effective.”).
108. Griffin, supra note 107, at 93.
109. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102, at 8 tbl.1 (describing percentages of
indigent defense expenditures attributable to states and counties in 2002).
110. See id. at 7–9 (describing the lack of state funding for indigent defense services). One
witness to the American Bar Association’s hearings described a Mississippi county that was
“nearly bankrupted by the expense of providing services in a death penalty case and was
compelled to file a lawsuit in 1999 in an effort to force the state to establish and fund a statewide
public defender system.” Id. at 9.
111. LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 5 tbl.1 (2009),
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9J2-E3KX]. Maine did not have
any public defender offices in 2007 and was thus not included in the report. Id.
112. STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 – STATISTICAL TABLES 4 tbl.2 (2011),
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KRP-99KB].
113. The term “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” appears to be quite ubiquitous. See GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102, at 16 (using the term “meet ‘em and plead ‘em”); Alexandra
Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1462–63
(2005) (same); Griffin, supra note 107, at 94 (same).
114. Griffin, supra note 107, at 94.
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widely from state to state.115 Some states cap compensation for
noncapital felony defense at $1000,116 while others will compensate
contracted lawyers up to $12,000.117
The low compensation for defense counsel generally results in
difficulty recruiting and retaining experienced lawyers.118 When
contracted defense counsel are paid a flat fee for their work,119
regardless of the hours required to provide effective assistance, the
compensation structure perversely incentivizes those lawyers to do a
minimal amount of work.120 Even for salaried public defenders, budget
constraints mean that they must take on massive caseloads, lessening
the amount of time they can spend with any individual defendant. The
American Bar Association recommends that public defenders take on,
per year, no more than “150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile,
200 mental health, or 25 appeals.”121 But as the American Bar
Association reported in 2004, “oftentimes caseloads far exceed
national standards, making it impossible for even the most industrious
of attorneys to deliver effective representation in all cases.”122 Public
115. See Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 912 (2010)
(“States vary widely with regard to funding levels, funding structures, and stability for indigent
defense.”).
116. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW app. 5.
Mississippi has an unwaivable cap of $1000 plus overhead expenses per noncapital felony case.
Id.
117. Id. at app. 6. Nevada will pay a maximum of $12,000 per case for felonies for which the
defendant is facing the possibility of life without parole, but if the defendant is facing less than
life without parole, Nevada caps out at $2500. Id.
118. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102, at 9 (“Inadequate compensation for
indigent defense attorneys is a national problem, which makes the recruitment and retention of
experienced attorneys extraordinarily difficult.”).
119. See Griffin, supra note 107, at 94 (“Many jurisdictions impose per-case caps regardless
of the seriousness or complexity of the case. For example, a defense attorney might earn $600–
$1200 for handling an entire felony trial.”).
120. Though there are not many empirical studies to prove this claim, a recent doctoral
dissertation does study the change in attorney’s reported hours when South Carolina switched its
payment method for contracted indigent defense lawyers from an hourly payment system to a
flat-fee system. Benjamin Schwall, A Study of How Different Incentive Systems Can Impact
Criminal Defense (May 2017) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Clemson University),
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2946&context=all_dissertations
[https://perma.cc/5TXT-2JFH]. The author found that the data “supports the idea that attorneys
work less when paid a flat fee.” Id. at 12.
121. A.B.A. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES
OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002), https://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbookl
et.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9AP-64GY].
122. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102, at 18.
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defenders in New Orleans, for example, handled an average of 19,000
cases per attorney in 2009, “which translated into seven minutes per
case.”123 These excessive caseloads result in less time spent with
defendants, less time investigating cases, less time preparing for trial,124
and less time for continued legal training.125
Given the reality of public defense, we should require more of
counsel and be skeptical of standards that rely on defense counsel to
stand in for defendants in decisionmaking. The current standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel leaves no room for any discussion of
attorneys’ resources:
[i]f the attorney’s performance is ultimately found objectively
unreasonable, the level of resources made available to that lawyer is
irrelevant. Likewise, if the attorney’s performance is found
constitutionally sufficient in any given case, it is of no consequence
that her office is severely underfunded or that other cases on her
docket may have suffered as a result.126

Moreover, the Strickland standard of “reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms”127 is problematic because “the norm
may itself be anemic,”128 in that it may have internalized the existing
lack of resources for most defense counsel into what counts as
“reasonable” defense work. Additionally, as Professor Sanjay
Chhablani argues, the low standard set by Strickland is in part to blame
for the underfunding of indigent defense:

123. THOMAS GIOVANNI & ROOPAL PATEL, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, GIDEON AT
50: THREE REFORMS TO REVIVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
4 (2013),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Gideon_Report_040913.pdf
[https://perma.cc/83LZ-RNX4]. The New Orleans caseloads do not seem far from normal: in 2008,
public defenders in Miami handled an average of 500 felony cases per attorney, and in 2010,
“Minnesota defenders reported devoting an average of 12 minutes per case, not including court
time . . . .” Id.
124. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 102, at 16–19 (reporting on the deficiencies
that result from overburdened defense attorneys).
125. See id. at 11 (reporting that several states lack “formal, systematic training of indigent
defense attorneys”); Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me To Do a Good Job
Representing My Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken—its-unconstitutional/2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.8c355e4b505c [https://perma.cc/5CRL-BMBA]
(“Because we don’t have enough lawyers on staff, the week I passed the bar in 2013, I began
representing people facing mandatory life sentences on felony charges.”).
126. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality To Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97
MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (2013).
127. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
128. Lucas, supra note 126, at 1208–09.
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[T]he absence of ex ante, meaningful guidance about the specific
obligations of counsel combined with the powerful presumptions of
competence and reasonableness have allowed jurisdictions to
severely under-fund defense systems. Had Strickland imposed more
robust obligations on counsel, jurisdictions would have been
compelled to provide more adequate funding or face the prospect of
appellate courts reversing convictions.129

Of course, judicial mandates do not come with funding, but an
increased standard for effective assistance could apply legislative
pressure to allocate more funds to indigent defense. As Chhablani
points out, a higher standard of review would likely mean more
convictions overturned by appellate courts,130 increasing the value of
effective defense to legislators.131 In other words, if more convictions
were overturned for ineffective assistance of counsel brought about by
the lack of funding for indigent defense, legislators might see fit to
allocate more budgetary dollars to ensure fewer overturned
convictions.
Raising the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is not
only imperative to improve the quality of indigent defense, but also to
ensure that the competency standard functions properly. As
implemented, the competency standard relies heavily on defense
counsel to help defendants who cannot immediately or easily
comprehend the trial process and even positions counsel to make
decisions for those defendants who are judged competent but are ill
equipped to make decisions at their trials.132 Because the consequences
for defendants judged incompetent are so poor—incompetent
defendants are typically civilly committed until they are competent to
stand trial or the charges against them are dropped133—the ideal
129. Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 393–94 (2009); see also William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 21 (1997)
(citations omitted) (“[N]othing in the law of criminal procedure regulates how much states must
spend on lawyers for defendants. This too is a consequence of ineffective assistance doctrine.”).
130. Chhablani, supra note 129, at 393–94.
131. This idea is borrowed from Professor Lisa Kern Griffin, who argues:
[A higher] baseline for constitutional competence . . . might induce some systemic
change . . . . Because of the sheer volume of cases in which the market for plea
bargaining and the market for publicly funded counsel intersect, even this slight
pressure on the regulatory lever could increase the incentive for state investment in
indigent defense.
Griffin, supra note 107, at 105.
132. For a discussion of the competency standard, see supra Part I.
133. For a discussion of the civil commitment of incompetent defendants, see supra note 103.
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solution is not simply to raise the competency standard but to ensure
that the system adequately protects defendants who are judged
competent by ensuring them a robust defense. Lowering the standard
for proving ineffective assistance of counsel would protect defendants’
right to a fair trial by requiring defendants have defense counsel who
can sufficiently assist them, as well as with recourse should their
counsel make a decision adverse to their interests or goals.
Unfortunately, the likelihood that the standard for proving
ineffective assistance of counsel will be lowered is not promising. In the
case that the standard is not lowered, enacting the procedural changes
proposed in the next Part of this Note is even more imperative: the
assistance of defense counsel justifies the minimal systemic concern
with defendants’ personal participation, yet defense counsel is held to
a low standard of effectiveness, and funding for indigent defense is so
inadequate that even highly skilled lawyers have insufficient funding to
challenge the prosecution. These shortfalls seem likely to continue,
meaning that defendants’ own involvement is increasingly critical. The
reforms proposed in the next Part could remove significant barriers to
defendants’ participation and make them more effective partners in
their defense.
III. THE PROCEDURAL RULES BARRING DEFENDANT
PARTICIPATION THROUGH SPEECH
Despite the competency standard and the right to counsel’s ideal
of defendant participation, the rules of criminal procedure do not
uniformly promote the concept. Instead, various procedural rules
discourage defendants from making one of the most meaningful and
effective contributions to the adjudications that effect their lives:
speaking at their trials and sentencing hearings. This Part first outlines
the importance of defendant speech, and then identifies the procedural
rules that effectively prevent defendants from speaking.
A. The Importance of Defendant Speech
Speech is one of the most important ways defendants can
participate in their own trials. Criminal trials affect the liberty interest
of the defendants alone, and yet “[c]riminal defendants rarely
speak.”134 Only about half of criminal defendants testify at their own

134. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1449.
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trials.135 For the more than 90 percent of criminal defendants who plead
guilty136 and waive the right to testify,137 the only opportunities for
speech are at the plea hearing, during which the plea colloquy often
yields one-word responses,138 and at sentencing,139 at which allocution
is constrained.140
Though the silence of criminal defendants is often lauded as a
protective measure,141 the lack of defendant speech throughout the

135. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision To Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 1353, 1373 tbl.2 (2009) (summarizing a finding that 49 percent of all defendants in the
study of 382 cases testified); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329–30 (1991) (“In a sample of Philadelphia felony
defendants tried in the 1980s, forty-nine percent chose not to testify at trial . . . . In a sample of
misdemeanor defendants, fifty-seven percent chose not to testify at trial . . . .”); see also Jeffrey
Bellin, The Silence Penalty, 103 IOWA L. REV. 395, 397 (2018) [hereinafter Bellin, Silence Penalty]
(“[O]nly about half of criminal defendants take the witness stand.”).
136. Ninety-one percent of all federal criminal defendants accused of a felony pled guilty in
2014. MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2013–2014 1, 26 tbl.14 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fjs1314.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC38-HBVC]. Ninety-four percent of felony offenders charged
in state courts pled guilty in 2006. SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD
FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 2006 – STATISTICAL TABLES 1, 25 tbl.4.1 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/RGM8-DFPM].
137. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E)–(F) (dictating that the trial judge must determine that
the defendant pleading guilty or nolo contendere understands that by doing so he is waiving his
right to testify).
138. See Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1463 (describing the plea colloquy as “consist[ing] of
highly scripted questions and the defendant’s monosyllabic ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers”).
139. See id., at 1458. As Natapoff notes, “[t]his description assumes representation by
counsel.” Id. at 1458 n.28.
140. For a description of the constraints for defendant allocution, see infra Part III.B.
141. The common wisdom about the Fifth Amendment right not to testify at one’s own trial
is that it protects defendants. See Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1450 (“Courts and scholars typically
treat this silencing as a victory for defendants.”). Professor Jeffrey Bellin explains:
The right to remain silent in the face of accusation has been widely celebrated in
American law, representing in the words of the Supreme Court “an important advance
in the development of our liberty” and “‘one of the great landmarks in man’s struggle
to make himself civilized.’” As famously stated, the right, among other things, protects
the guilty defendant from “the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt,”
by allowing the guilty to sit silently while “‘requiring the government . . . to shoulder
the entire load’” of a criminal prosecution. The Court has emphasized that the values
protected by the right not to testify are so important that they easily overcome the fact
that it may on occasion “save a guilty man from his just [deserts].”
Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials through Legal Rules that Encourage
Defendants To Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 862–63 (2008) (citations omitted) [hereinafter
Bellin, Improving Reliability]. Rather than arguing that this understanding of the right not to
testify is incorrect, this Note asserts that defendant testimony has benefits to the defendant and
the criminal system that should also be recognized and protected.
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criminal justice system has costs to the defendant and to the system.
For defendants, the inability to speak can have grave implications for
case outcomes. Courts and scholars have long recognized that “a
defendant who does not take the stand will probably fatally prejudice
his chances of acquittal.”142 Jurors expect defendants to testify,143 and
though jurors are told not to use a defendant’s silence at trial against
him, “the empirical evidence . . . demonstrates that remaining silent
comes at a price.”144 In a February 2002 poll, about half of the 900
respondents surveyed said that a defendant who does not testify “‘is
probably guilty’ or ‘has something to hide.’”145 Jurors likely use the
same logic; studies have shown that mock jurors more readily convict
defendants who do not testify.146 Professor Jeffrey Bellin calls this the
“silence penalty” because the higher rate of conviction for defendants
who do not testify is so consistent that it can be described as a
punishment.147
The inability to speak also has damaging implications for the
defendant personally, as “silent defendants are denied many of the
cognitive and participatory benefits of expressive engagement in their
own cases.”148 For example, “[d]efendants who remain silent
throughout the legal process are less likely to understand their own
cases, engage the dictates of the law intellectually, accept the
legitimacy of the outcomes, feel remorse, or change as a result of the
experience.”149 Defendants who do not speak miss out on the
humanizing aspects of speech, both to the factfinder, who primarily
sees the defendant as the accused,150 and to the defendant himself, who
142. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 58 n.5 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting
Note, The Influence of the Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J.
204, 212 n.36 (1956)); see also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 340 n.10 (1978) (noting that the
adverse assumption based on defendant’s failure to testify “may be inevitable”).
143. Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don’t:
Jurors’ Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 60,
62 (2005) (analyzing the results of the Capital Jury Project’s survey of decisionmaking by capital
jurors to mean “that jurors wanted or expected the defendant to testify on his or her own behalf”).
144. Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 135, at 407.
145. Id. at 407 (citing Fox News Poll conducted by Opinion Dynamics (Feb. 2002)).
146. See id. at 408 (citing David R. Shaffer, The Defendant’s Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 124 (Saul M. Kassim & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds.,
1985)).
147. See generally id. (coining the term).
148. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1451.
149. Id.
150. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Introduction: Taking the Stand, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1,
5–6 (1993) (“It is almost impossible to see the defendant as a deserving person unless he testifies,
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endures an otherwise “dehumaniz[ing]” process.151 Testifying in court
is an important opportunity to portray the defendant to the jury as a
full human, worthy of sympathy as well as censure. As Professor
Barbara Babcock describes it:
It is almost impossible to see the defendant as a deserving person
unless he testifies, partly because the natural order of the trial
dehumanizes him. For hours, days, even months, the jury has heard
the government’s witnesses—the victims and the professionals:
experts and police. Again and again, [the jury has] seen the moving
finger point to the sullen, or perhaps sad, but always silent, accused.
Then, finally, he takes the stand and is suddenly revealed: with a
family or not, educated thus, worked in these ways . . . . As a practical
matter, the only real chance the defendant has to speak to the jury is
by taking the stand . . . .152

It is unclear how exactly this moment of humanization affects
juries, but based on the higher conviction rates for defendants who do
not testify, it seems crucial to show the defendant to the jury as a full
person.
Defendant silence also has negative implications for the accuracy
of the criminal justice system. Defendants who do not speak during the
trial can withhold important factual information from the factfinder,
putting the accuracy of the trial at risk.153 Defendant speech during
allocution at sentencing can also have a bearing on how the judge
evaluates the deserved sentence, but defendant speech may be even
more significant at the trial itself.154
The lack of defendant speech can also damage external
perceptions of the criminal justice system. As Professor Alexandra
Natapoff points out, “speech is the constitutionally celebrated vehicle
by which defendants have their ‘day in court,’ enforce or waive their
constitutional rights, tell their stories to the jury, persuade the judge of
partly because the natural order of the trial dehumanizes him.”); Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond
Mitigation: Towards a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2644 (2007) (“Another
persistent rationale for allocution—and for sentencing hearings in general—is individualization
or humanization of the defendant.”).
151. Babcock, supra note 150, at 6.
152. Id. at 5–6 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
153. See Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 854 (“When the defendant, ‘who
above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution’s case,’ is silent, the jury is deprived
of critical factual information.” (quoting Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582 (1961))).
154. See generally Thomas, supra note 150, at 2655–57 (explaining the mitigation theory of
allocution). Allocution is the point in a plea hearing at which the defendant is permitted to speak.
For further discussion of the power of speech at allocution, see infra Part III.C.
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proper punishment, and communicate with their constitutionally
guaranteed counsel.”155 Losing out on these “democratic speech
functions” can constrain the public’s trust in the system.156 This loss of
trust is exacerbated by the demographics of criminal defendants,
because “[t]he silencing of defendants serves to disproportionately
quiet the voices of the poor and people of color within the court
system.”157 So not only are criminal defendants often “silenced by their
typical status as impoverished, young, undereducated people of color,”
they are additionally silenced by the criminal justice system itself, in
which they are more likely to be embroiled precisely because of their
status as “impoverished, young, undereducated people of color.”158
Defendant speech is thus vital because “being heard within the legal
process can be an important part of a larger power struggle over social
meaning.”159
Lastly, of course, defendant silence flies in the face of one of the
primary interests of the competency standard—ensuring that a
defendant can assist in preparing her defense.160 Given how impactful
defendant speech can be to the judge and the jury, speaking affords
defendants their best opportunity to assist in their own defense.161 If we
take the ideal of defendant participation seriously, we should work to
protect defendants’ ability to help their defense in the most meaningful
way possible, by zealously guarding defendants’ ability to speak.
B. Strengthen the Right To Testify
Because defendant testimony (or lack thereof) so often influences
trial outcomes, providing this testimony is one of the most important
ways the accused can act in her own defense. Defendants do not have
the legal knowledge to make objections or argue legal minutiae, and
they lack the experience necessary to cross-examine witnesses
155. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1452.
156. Id.
157. Thomas, supra note 150, at 2643. As Natapoff explains, “[d]efendant silence . . . is part
of a larger phenomenon of expressive disempowerment of those disadvantaged groups who tend
to become defendants: racial minorities, the poor, the undereducated or illiterate, juveniles, the
unemployed, or people with criminal histories, mental health or substance abuse problems.”
Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1452.
158. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1453.
159. Id.
160. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (describing traditional refusals to make
incompetent defendants unable to defend themselves stand trial).
161. For more on the effectiveness of defendant testimony, see supra note 147 and
accompanying text.
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successfully. What defendants can contribute to their defense—what
will make the biggest impact on the jury162—is their testimony. If the
criminal system cares at all about defendant participation, this is the
facet of defendant participation to protect. But several procedural
rules—particularly the sentence enhancement for perjury and the
impeachment rules—create significant risks for defendants who choose
to testify, making the choice to testify an unbalanced one. These rules
may not formally prevent defendants from taking the stand, but they
make the consequences of testifying so great that many defendants are
in effect prevented from speaking at their trials. These procedural rules
keeping defendants from testifying should thus be changed to give
more defendants a meaningful choice about whether to participate in
their trials in this key way.163 This Section first discusses the sentence
enhancement for perjury and then examines the various impeachment
rules that make the choice to testify a very difficult one for many
defendants.
1. Perjury Rules. The threat of perjury operates to silence criminal
defendants. The risk of a perjury prosecution must give some
defendants pause, but the greater danger is the near-certain possibility
of a sentence enhancement.164 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
contain a two-level sentence enhancement for defendants who are
found to have “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of
conviction,”165 which includes “committing, suborning, or attempting
to suborn perjury . . . .”166 Many state sentencing guidelines contain
similar provisions.167
The sentencing enhancement essentially punishes defendants for
asserting their innocence and being disbelieved by the judge. “The only
reason for a defendant to testify is to offer exculpatory testimony,

162. For more on juries’ expectation of defendant testimony, see supra notes 143–47 and
accompanying text.
163. For various reasons, certain defendants and their lawyers may decide that it is in the
defendants’ best interests not to testify, but this Note advocates for a criminal justice system in
which more defendants have a meaningful choice.
164. Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 878 (describing the risk of the sentencing
enhancement as “a more realistic and immediate punishment”).
165. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
166. Id. at cmt. 4(B).
167. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1459 n.31.
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which will almost always contradict the government’s evidence,
thereby inviting” accusations of perjury and the associated sentencing
enhancement if the defendant is ultimately convicted.168 And because
the sentencing enhancement, unlike a conviction for perjury, is
determined by only a preponderance of the evidence169 and is
accomplished without expending prosecutorial resources,170 the
enhancement is more of a certainty and thus a bigger danger. “[I]t
cannot be lost on defendants—even innocent ones—that if they sit
silently though the presentation of evidence, relying on counsel to
speak for them, they are amenable to no increased penalty.”171
As Babcock has asked, “Why should there be such a price for
taking the stand unsuccessfully?”172 The sentencing enhancement
serves either to limit defendant testimony “to a denial of the charges”173
or to prevent defendants from testifying, all for fear of a longer
sentence. “In effect, trial silence, if contrasted with an unsuccessful
effort at claiming innocence through testimony, can be predicted to
result in an effective two-level decrease under the sentencing
guidelines.”174 Moreover, the enhancement undermines the ideal of
defendant participation. The competency standard demonstrates that
our legal system values defendant participation, yet the sentencing
enhancement creates a perverse incentive not to participate.
2. Impeachment. When witnesses testify at trial, they can be
discredited with evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible,
including evidence of prior convictions.175 When a defendant takes the
witness stand, he is not exempt from the impeachment rules, which
168. Id. at 1460. Indeed, nearly 98 percent of federal defendants who went to trial between
October 1, 2015 and September 30, 2016 received the enhancement for obstruction of justice. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2016).
169. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 228–29 (2005) (noting that the sentencing
judge had found by a preponderance of evidence that sentencing enhancements applied); see also
McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986) (holding that a state statute subjecting
defendants to a sentencing enhancement found by preponderance of the evidence does not violate
due process).
170. As Jeffrey Bellin explains, “[t]he practical barriers to such a prosecution in the form of a
necessary expenditure of prosecution resources in a separate trial for an offense generally viewed
as difficult to prove, make this an unlikely occurrence for any trial witness, including the
defendant.” Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 877–78.
171. Id. at 879.
172. Babcock, supra note 150, at 7.
173. Id.
174. Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 879–80.
175. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (allowing evidence of past convictions to impeach witnesses).
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allow the opposing party to use otherwise inadmissible evidence to
attack a witness’s truthfulness, though they might be more damaging
to him than to other witnesses.176 Furthermore, defendants who testify
can be impeached with evidence that is normally not admissible
because it was collected in violation of the defendant’s constitutional
rights.177 This impeachment evidence should be excluded to better
allow defendants to participate in their trials in the most meaningful
way possible.
a. By Evidence of Prior Convictions. Taking the witness stand
makes criminal defendants vulnerable to impeachment with evidence
of prior convictions.178 Prosecutors are generally unable to admit
evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts as evidence of the defendant’s
bad character,179 but the Federal Rules of Evidence contain a host of
workarounds that allow evidence of the defendant’s prior bad acts to
be admitted as evidence of something else.180 Rule 609 is one such
workaround; it allows parties to introduce evidence of a witness’s
previous conviction for any felony or for any crimes involving
dishonesty to impeach the witness, including a defendant.181 The
evidence of prior convictions is admitted to show only that the witness’s
truthfulness cannot be trusted, and jurors are instructed not to use the
evidence as proof of the defendant’s guilt, moral desert, or propensity
for crime.182

176. See Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 153, at 867 n.53 (collecting cases recognizing
that impeachment by conviction is especially dangerous to defendants).
177. For more on impeachment with evidence collected in violation of constitutional rights,
see infra Part III.B.2.b.
178. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (allowing evidence of a witness’s prior conviction “for a crime
that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than
one year” and “for any crime regardless of punishment” that requires proving “a dishonest act or
false statement” for conviction).
179. See FED. R. EVID. 404 (prohibiting use of character evidence or evidence of prior bad
acts to demonstrate character).
180. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2) (permitting evidence of prior bad acts as proof of “motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of
accident”).
181. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
182. See Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 135, at 401–02 (“As the evidence is admissible only
with respect to the ‘witness’s character for truthfulness,’ judges must instruct juries that the
testifying defendant’s ‘prior convictions should only be used to judge [the defendant’s] credibility
rather than his propensity to commit crimes.” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 609; then quoting United
States v. Stanley, 94 F. App’x 984, 986 (4th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original))); see also Kathryn
Stanchi & Deirdre Bowen, This is Your Sword: How Damaging Are Prior Convictions to Plaintiffs
in Civil Trials?, 89 WASH. L. REV. 901, 908 (2014) (“Rule 609 allows the admission of prior
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Jurors, however, seem unable to observe the distinction between
impeachment for credibility and propensity for crime. “Most studies
show that admission of a defendant’s prior conviction leads to more
guilty verdicts in criminal trials, regardless of whether the jurors
receive a limiting instruction.”183 Moreover, the evidence shows that
jurors convict more readily when the conviction is for a similar crime
than when the conviction involves dishonesty,184 exposing the fact that
jurors are using evidence of prior convictions, intended strictly to
impeach for honesty, as evidence of propensity or even guilt. As Bellin
explains:
If jurors used prior convictions as the law intends, past crimes that
undermined the defendant’s truthful character, such as perjury, would
be the most damaging to defendants’ chances of acquittal. Yet
empirical research has shown that even when properly instructed,
mock jurors convict most readily when presented with prior crimes
that are similar to the charged crime, not, as the operating legal theory
would predict, when presented with crimes related to dishonesty.185

Bellin’s own study confirmed the existing evidence.186 Mock jurors
were presented with one of four scenarios, each one presenting
different versions of the same trial, in which the defendant was accused
of “breaking into a store and stealing jewelry.”187 What varied in each
scenario was whether the defendant testified and whether she was
impeached with evidence of a prior conviction.188 The mock jurors were
then asked whether they would find the defendant guilty or not
guilty.189 The mock jurors most readily convicted the defendant who
had testified and had been impeached with evidence of a prior
conviction for robbery.190 Eighty-two percent of the mock jurors
presented with that scenario responded that they would find the
defendant guilty, compared to 73 percent of mock jurors who

conviction evidence only for the narrow purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness. The
evidence is not meant to show that the witness is simply a bad person, more likely to have
committed other crimes, or somehow less deserving of justice or damages.”).
183. Stanchi & Bowen, supra note 182, at 911.
184. See id. (“The negative impact is, not surprisingly, more profound when the prior
conviction is for a similar crime as the one with which the defendant is charged.”).
185. Bellin, Silence Penalty, supra note 135, at 403 (citing Shaffer, supra note 146, at 131).
186. Id. at 413.
187. Id. at 410, 412.
188. Id. at 412.
189. Id. at 413
190. Id.
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responded that they would convict a defendant who had testified and
been impeached with evidence of a criminal conviction for fraud.191
This impeachment rule is harsh on defendants, widely used, and
not supported by social science. A 1966 study found that evidence of
defendants’ prior convictions was revealed in 72 percent of cases in
which the defendant testified.192 But as many scholars have argued,
“character evidence”—including that of prior convictions—“often fails
the test of logical relevance” because the character evidence allowed
in courts is not “valuable either in establishing character or in making
an accurate prediction of the individual’s behavior on a specific
occasion.”193 Rather than admitting useful evidence into trial, “Rule
609 and its counterparts create and reinforce a false view of human
nature,”194 one that is all the more damaging because it is not strictly
necessary at trials. Juries are not blind to the fact that defendants have
a significant interest in the outcome of the trial,195 and are thus already
skeptical of defendant testimony at trial.196
When that preexisting skepticism is combined with the fact that
juries are not using evidence of prior convictions for proof of veracity,
the value of this evidence begins to wane. Add to that the way
impeachment evidence undermines the ideal of defendant
participation, and it becomes unclear why this evidence is admissible
against criminal defendants. It is not serving its intended purpose and
is weakening one of the foundational beliefs of our justice system—
that defendants should be able to participate.
b. Through Loopholes to Constitutional Protections. When
defendants take the witness stand on their own behalf, they can be
impeached with evidence that would be otherwise excluded for
191. Id. This finding is of statistical significance in this survey. Id. at 414 n.98. For more
information on Bellin’s calculations, see id.
192. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 147 tbl.44 (1966).
193. David P. Leonard, The Use of Character To Prove Conduct: Rationality and Catharsis in
the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26, 30 (1986); see also Robert G. Lawson, Credibility
and Character: A Different Look at an Interminable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 758, 779–
89 (1975) (summarizing social science to reach the conclusion that “the probative worth of
character evidence is very low”); Stanchi & Bowden, supra note 182, at 909 (offering a list of legal
commentators making this point).
194. Stanchi & Bowden, supra note 182, at 909.
195. See United States v. Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Nothing could be more
obvious, and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant’s profound interest in the
verdict.”).
196. See Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 885 (arguing that juries are already
skeptical of defendant testimony).
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violating the defendant’s constitutionally protected rights. This
evidence includes statements taken in violation of defendants’ Fifth
Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona;197 statements obtained
without presence of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment;198
physical evidence found and taken in violation of the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights;199 and defendants’ testimony from a
previous suppression hearing.200 This evidence is normally excluded
from trials to deter violations of constitutional rights,201 but the Court
has ruled that “some marginal deterrence of constitutional violations
must be sacrificed to avoid ‘impairment of the integrity of the
factfinding goals of the criminal trial.’”202
The allowance of evidence obtained in defiance of constitutionally
protected rights for impeachment purposes makes testifying riskier for
defendants. Though this evidence is admitted only for impeachment
purposes, juries are notoriously bad at properly differentiating
between evidence for impeachment and evidence for guilt.203
Ultimately, the inclusion of this evidence “function[s] to deter
197. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1975)
(holding that an officer’s testimony based on questioning of defendant that occurred absent
Miranda warnings were admissible for the purposes of the defendant’s impeachment); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (“It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
against an accused in the prosecution’s case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course
that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.”).
198. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990) (holding that statements taken without
counsel that are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief are admissible to impeach the
defendant); see also Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 869 n.61 (explaining the
Supreme Court’s holdings).
199. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (permitting the inclusion of illegally
obtained heroin to impeach defendant’s testimony that he had never possessed narcotics).
200. See United States v. Quesada-Rosadal, 685 F.2d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony from the suppression hearing
to be used as impeachment evidence). Bellin argues that “[t]he Court has not determined whether
such testimony may be used to impeach a testifying defendant, but this result logically follows
from the Court’s other decisions, as a number of courts have recognized.” Bellin, Improving
Reliability, supra note 141, at 870 n.66.
201. See Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 869 (explaining that these rules “are
intended to safeguard the citizenry’s constitutional rights by deterring constitutional
violations. . . .”); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (“Ever since its inception, the rule
excluding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as a
principal mode of discouraging lawless police conduct. . . . [W]ithout it the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a mere ‘form of words.’”
(citations omitted)).
202. Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 869–70 (quoting United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980)).
203. For more on how jurors misuse impeachment evidence, see supra notes 183–91 and
accompanying text.
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defendants from taking the witness stand by increasing the tactical
disadvantages to doing so and decreasing the ultimate weight of any
testimony a defendant offers.”204
When allowing this evidence in for impeachment, the Court has
often mentioned the importance of factfinding during trials.205 But
promulgating rules that keep defendants off the witness stand hinders
the factfinding function of a trial by silencing one of the primary actors
in the alleged crime, potentially keeping whatever facts she alone
knows from the factfinder. Moreover, this conception of factfinding is
in opposition to the reasoning behind the competency standard. The
competency standard is intended to protect defendant participation by
enabling better factfinding and increased accuracy.206 These
impeachment rules, however, reduce defendant participation in the
name of factfinding. Because the belief in defendant participation is so
fundamental to our criminal justice system, the rules of evidence
should exclude illegally obtained evidence to encourage defendants to
testify more frequently.
C. Sentencing Allocution
In addition to defendant testimony at trial, the other primary place
for defendant speech during the criminal process is during allocution
at the sentencing hearing. Allocution comes from a longstanding
tradition of allowing defendants to speak on their own behalf at
sentencing,207 and was originally restricted to presenting affirmative
defenses.208 In today’s criminal system, in which over 90 percent of
criminal defendants forego trials and plead guilty, and only half of
those that do go to trial actually testify, many defendants will never
speak until allocution at the sentencing hearing.209 It is still often
thought of as the sanctioned point in the sentencing hearing for
204. Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 871.
205. See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (“This Court has carved out
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, however, where the introduction of reliable and probative
evidence would significantly further the truth-seeking function of a criminal trial. . . .”).
206. For more on how the common law’s concern for accuracy motivated the prohibition on
trying incompetent defendants, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.
207. See Thomas, supra note 150, at 2645 (explaining that, at common law, allocution was
afforded to people convicted of capital felonies).
208. Id. at 2645–46. At common law, when defendants were unrepresented by counsel and
prevented from testifying during the trial, allocution was the one place for defendants to speak.
Id. at 2645. It was the sanctioned place for the defendant to put forth affirmative defenses. Id.
209. See id. at 2643 (“Most [defendants]—however remorseful, justified, or angry—will not
have a chance to speak until the sentencing hearing.”).
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defendants to present mitigating evidence to the judge,210 but
defendants are not formally constrained to presenting only mitigating
evidence at allocution.211 Still, defendants are informally restricted by
the Sentencing Guidelines to making certain types of statements
because the Guidelines contain a sentence decrease for a defendant
who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his
offense.”212 Professor Kimberly Thomas points out that this downward
departure serves to discourage or prevent defendants from making
statements that deviate from favored narratives like mitigating
evidence, acceptance of responsibility, and penitence.213
The telling of defendants’ stories, even disfavored stories, is
beneficial to the defendant and the system, and should not be
discouraged. The ability to speak during allocution has an important
humanizing effect on the defendant, who has been dehumanized
routinely throughout the trial process.214 And because the criminal
justice system disproportionately ensnares members of disenfranchised
minority communities, who are so silenced by the criminal system,215
these personal allocution stories allow defendants an opportunity to be
heard, to be realized as individual humans uniquely affected by the
criminal process. Affording defendants that opportunity is one small
way to afford them autonomy in the process, while disallowing it can
be yet another way that defendants—and the minority communities
from which they disproportionately come—lose faith in the criminal
system.
By discouraging defendant speech throughout the criminal justice
system, the system also loses out on opportunities to understand the
experience of defendants. Stories apart from mitigation, “stories that
might offer alternative accounts of the case or the offender, including
stories of racism in the criminal justice system, economic oppression of
the defendant, or other counter-hegemonic themes,” allow the system
210. See id. at 2655 (“Mitigation is a commonly cited purpose of allocution.”).
211. See FED R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4) (mandating simply that the court give the defendant the
“opportunity to speak”); see also Allocution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining “allocution” as a “[a] trial judge’s formal address to a convicted defendant, asking
whether the defendant wishes to make a statement or to present information in mitigation of the
sentence to be imposed.”).
212. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
213. Thomas, supra note 150, at 2664–65.
214. Babcock, supra note 150, at 5–6 (mentioning that “the natural order of the trial
dehumanizes” defendants).
215. For more on how the criminal justice system disproportionately affects and silences
minorities, see supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.
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as a whole to understand and account for the defendant’s
perspective.216 As Bellin explains, “[b]y encouraging defendants to
remain silent throughout the process, the system suffers an
‘institutional loss of information about defendant perceptions and
experiences’ that decreases any potential recognition of what works,
what does not work, and what should be changed.”217 Allowing
defendants to allocute in whatever way they want opens the door to
insight about defendants’ experience of the criminal justice system that
it might otherwise never get, especially because so many criminal
defendants do not go to trial or do not speak at trial.
Furthermore, allowing defendants the full breadth of possible
statements at allocution is another point at which the criminal system
can abide by its ideal of defendant participation. Blackstone noted that
the importance of presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing was one
of the reasons for the prohibition on sentencing incompetent
defendants,218 and we should expand the view of the utility of allocution
past mitigating evidence alone. There are important functions to
allocution statements that do not present mitigating circumstances, and
we should protect defendants’ ability to participate in their sentencing
by giving those statements as well.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the competency standard and the right to
counsel, our criminal justice system has a longstanding commitment to
ensuring that criminal defendants are able to participate—at least to
some degree—in the trials and adjudications that affect their lives.

216. Thomas, supra note 150, at 2666. Thomas asserts that these nonhegemonic stories are
“necessary.” Id. at 2665 (emphasis in original). She recounts Nelson Mandela’s allocution at his
sentencing hearing:
Before being sentenced to life imprisonment, Nelson Mandela stood, dignified, before
his sentencing court and elegantly stated that he did the acts for which he was convicted
and was proud to have done them. Mandela did not seek to mitigate his punishment or
apologize for his conduct. He also suggested an alternative vision of justice in the face
of what he believed to be an unjust system. His words flew in the face of the sentencing
court and questioned the legitimacy of his prosecution.
Id. at 2665–66. Of course Nelson Mandel is not the run-of-the-mill defendant, but the episode
illustrates what the criminal justice system misses out on by constraining defendant speech at
allocution: instances of defendant speech that can dignify and humanize defendants and that can
expose the court to the experience of being a criminal defendant.
217. Bellin, Improving Reliability, supra note 141, at 858.
218. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 9, at *24 (“If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his
senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced . . . had the prisoner been of sound
memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment. . . .”).
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Despite the fundamental nature of that commitment, the U.S. criminal
justice system does not ensure or protect defendant participation at
every stage of the criminal process. Instead, the system is riddled with
constitutional standards and procedural rules that discourage or
prevent participation.
The rules that prevent defendants from testifying at trial are
particularly damaging because they prevent defendants from meeting
one of the mandates of the competency standard—assisting in their
defense—in one of the most impactful ways possible. In light of the
criminal system’s underlying ideal of defendant participation, these
procedural rules should be changed in order to build a criminal system
that allows defendants to receive the full benefit of that ideal.
The standard for ineffective assistance of counsel also works to
hinder defendant participation at trial, by creating a regime in which
defense counsel can make decisions for their clients and face no
reproach if those decisions are adverse to their client’s wishes or
interests. Lowering the standard for proving ineffective assistance
would not just impose higher requirements on defense counsel, it
would also force defense counsel to be more deferential to their clients’
wishes, affording defendants more control over their cases.
Ultimately, changing these constitutional standards and
procedural rules would likely give defendants more chances to
participate in their trials, or at least more meaningful choices about
how much they want to participate. Some defendants may always
choose not to testify at trial or allocute at sentencing, but our current
system distorts the benefits and drawbacks of that choice, making it
unnecessarily damaging to many defendants. In light of the
foundational ideal of defendant participation evident in the
competency standard and the right to counsel, the criminal justice
system should seek to afford defendants the opportunity to participate
rather than putting procedural hurdles in the way of that participation.

